. Another chapter in this story is the re-introduction of infinitesimal based arguments in the proofs of nonstandard analysis (Robinson, 1966) . This reflects a further change in the nature and standards of proof accepted in analysis, from those based on arithmetic to those of axiomatic first-order logic (Lakatos. 1978; Robinson, 1967) . Many other such examples can be sighted. These include in the late nineteenth century, the shift of geometric demonstrations from those relying on spatial intuition to a reliance on an axiomatic logical basis (Hilbert, 1899; Richards, 1989) ; the move to an axiomatic basis in arithmetic proofs (Peano, 1889);  an the axiomatic rigorization of deductive logic itself (Frege, 1879).
To dwell a little longer on an example, a funher example of a "revolution in mathematics' is the shift of standards of proof in algebra in the nineteenth century. These changed dramatically from intuitive generalizations of arithmetic to a deductive axiomatic basis (Richards, 1987) . The conceptual difficulties in making this transition should not be underestimated. The rigid attachment to the field-structure of number, The outcome of this radical restructuring is a new or revised scientific and epistemological context for mathematics.
valuable, and views concerning the scope and structure of mathematics. Such changes can result in a profound re-orientation of mathematics.
The outcome of this radical restructuring is a new or revised scientific and epistemological context for mathematics. In particular, it represents a global restructuring of the epistemology underlying mathematics, and the way truth, proof and meaning are conceptualized by the mathematical community. In the examples cited, not only did the standards of proof change. In addition the criteria for evaluating mathematical theories changed, for these themselves are largely based on the proof and definition standards employed in the formulations of the the theory. Such shifts do seem to correspond well to Kuhn's notion of scientific revolution, and would not appear to admit multiplicity as in the case with mathematical theories. In other words, like HMN Journal #8 scientific theories, multiple epistemological frameworks cannot consistently coexist in mathematics, justifying the extension of Kuhn's theory 10mathematics.
A number of other authors have also suggested that there are revolutions in mathematics, including Kircher (1984) , Gillies (forthcoming), and McCleary (1989) . Overall, whilst agreeing with Griffiths that Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions cannot be directly applied to mathematics, my claim is that a transformation of it directed at the underlying epistemological contest, instead of just at mathematical theories, does offer a valuable insight to the history and philosophy of mathematics.
A final aside is that the above argument offers grounds for a criticism of Lakatos (1976) . 
